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in 2000, at over two-and-a-half times the cost. The number of
attack ads nearly doubled. Special-interest groups and political
parties provided over three quarters of the candidate funding,
and covered almost 90% of the costs of the attack ads. The
average cost of a successful campaign increased by 45% to over
$650,000.  A 2004 national survey found that 71% of
Americans believed that judicial campaign contributions from
special-interest groups affect judges’ decisions in the court-
room.5
Efforts such as these to achieve judicial accountability in
ways that unnecessarily or unduly interfere with the indepen-
dence of the judiciary are inappropriate. Unfair personal
attacks on judges, and electoral campaigns by special-interest
groups to unseat judges with whose judicial decisions they dis-
agree, unduly interfere with judicial independence and are
inappropriate means of securing judicial accountability.
Indeed, the comments of DeLay and Cornyn brought imme-
diate rebuke as improper interference with judicial indepen-
dence. Vice President Richard B. Cheney called DeLay’s com-
ments “inappropriate.” Cheney added, “There’s a reason why
judges get lifetime appointments”6
President George W. Bush declared “I believe in an inde-
pendent judiciary.”7 The Washington Post editorialized that
“this country has an independent judiciary precisely to shield
judges who make difficult decisions under intense political
and time pressure from the bullying of politicians.”8 DeLay
apologized.9
The National Center for State Courts, the American Bar
Association, the Justice at Stake Campaign, and other organi-
zations now lead national efforts to reduce the threat to judi-
cial independence that arises out of the use of campaign attack
ads, undue electoral influence of special-interest groups and
political parties, and other harmful judicial-election campaign
practices.   
There are many threats to judicial independence. Roscoe
Pound observed 100 years ago that “dissatisfaction with the
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Much attention has focused of late on unfair attacks onjudges leveled in nominal pursuit of greater judicialaccountability. In response to the refusal of the fed-
eral courts to intervene in the Terry Schiavo case, for example,
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay angrily declared that
Congress has for many years “shirked its responsibility to hold
the judiciary accountable.”  
“No longer,” the leader said. “We will look at an arrogant,
out of control, unaccountable judiciary that thumbed their
nose at the Congress and President when given jurisdiction to
hear this case anew. . . .  The time will come for the men
responsible for this to answer for their behavior.”1
A week later Senator John Cornyn, commenting on
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s recent majority
opinion holding unconstitutional the death penalty for juve-
nile offenders, speculated that recent courthouse violence
might be due to public frustration with decisions of judges
who “are unaccountable to the public.” 2 Others called for
Justice Kennedy’s impeachment.3 Not to be outdone in the
pursuit of judicial accountability, author Edwin Vieira said his
“bottom line” for dealing with such errant judges came from
Joseph Stalin: “He had a slogan and it worked very well for him
whenever he ran into difficulty,” Vieira declared: “‘No man, no
problem.’”4
Much recent attention has also focused on expanded efforts
to achieve judicial accountability of elected state judiciaries
through the ballot box.  In 2004, for example, state supreme
court incumbents faced opposition in 18 of the 20 states with
contested elections on the ballot. Supreme court campaigns





F o o t n o t e s
1. See Mike Allen, DeLay Wants Panel to Review Role of Courts;
Democrats Criticize His Attack on Judges, WASH. POST, April 2,
2005, at A9; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republican Lawmakers Fire Back
at Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A10.
2. See Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to “Political”
Decisions; “Unaccountable” Judiciary Raises Ire, WASH. POST, April
5, 2005, at A7.
3. See Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty,
WASH. POST, April 9, 2005, at A3.
4. See id.
5. The 2004 judicial-election information is detailed in DEBORAH
GOLDBERG, SARAH SAMIS, EDWIN BENDER, & RACHEL WEISS, THE
NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 (2005) (Jesse Rutledge,
www.courtools.org.  An overview can be found on the Resource
Page of this issue of Court Review at page 44.
10. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 438
(1950) (Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting). 
11. These measures, called CourTools, are available at http://
Court Review 5
administration of justice is as old as law.”  And, clearly, there is
no easier way to strike a harmonious chord with an audience
of judges than to decry the increasing number of unfair per-
sonal attacks on the judiciary. Yet, many sources of dissatisfac-
tion and threats to judicial independence are beyond our con-
trol. Unfair attacks on appointed and elected judges typically
emanate from controversial judicial decisions involving issues
affecting powerful special interests—or about which segments
of the public hold intense or evangelical views.  Justice
Jackson, to whose memory this lecture series is dedicated,
spoke himself of this phenomenon over a half century ago.
“[W]e must not forget,” he observed, “that in our country are
evangelists and zealots of many different political, economic,
and religious persuasions whose fanatical conviction is that all
thought is divinely classified into two kinds—that which is
their own and that which is false and dangerous.”10 Despite the
best efforts of judges to effectively explain and communicate
their decisions, public expression of dissatisfaction with judi-
cial decisions—and unfair attacks on judges—are inevitable.  
As Pogo reminds us, however, oftentimes “we have met the
enemy and it is us.” Oftentimes, we as judicial officers allow
threats that originate outside the judiciary to distract us from
proper focus on the much more dangerous threats that result
from our own unsatisfactory performance.  We become pre-
occupied with the external threats to judicial independence
over which we have little control rather than fully accepting
accountability for our own performance—over which we have
almost complete control. We must examine our own perfor-
mance honestly—and demonstrate the courage and ability to
improve our performance when it is found insufficient. 
Judicial independence concerns the judiciary’s freedom
from improper control, influence, or interference in the deci-
sion of cases—and in the governance and management of the
judiciary’s affairs. Sometimes we forget that judicial indepen-
dence is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end.
With respect to judicial decision making, the object of judicial
independence is to ensure judicial fairness—that judicial deci-
sions are based solely on evidence and law and not influenced
by any improper consideration. With respect to judicial deci-
sion making, judicial independence is the freedom to be fair.
Judicial accountability refers to the accountability under
democratic government of those who govern to those whom
they govern—as well as to the rule of law.  Unfortunately,
unfair attacks on the courts—and other inappropriate acts
u n d e rtaken in the name of judicial accountability—have
tended to give the concept of judicial accountability itself a bad
name. But unlike the concept of judicial independence,
accountability is an end in itself and applies to all three
branches of government. The judiciary is not exempt from the
requirement of accountability to the people it serves for the
proper performance of its duties.
When we as judges speak of judicial independence as if it
is an end in itself, or as if it is unlimited, or intended mere l y
for our own personal benefit
as judges rather than for the
benefit of litigants, we risk
c reating the impression that
we re g a rd ourselves as being
above the law, or less
accountable for our perf o r-
mance than other govern-
mental officials are for
theirs.  The judiciary is after
all a co-equal branch of gov-
e rnment, neither lesser nor
superior to any other.
Judicial independence does
not excuse the courts fro m
compliance with appro p r i-
ate standards of account-
ability:  it merely helps define the standards of accountability
that are appropriate.  
How shall we be judged? By what standards should the
courts be held accountable? It is critical that the courts them-
selves define and communicate the standards by which their
performance may properly be judged. Unless and until we do
so, we will continue to be judged by standards, oftentimes
inappropriate, fashioned by others. We must define and com-
municate not only what the public does not have a right to
expect from the courts, but also what the public and other
branches do have the right to expect. 
The public does not have the right to expect, for example,
that judicial decisions will invariably be popular or always to
its satisfaction.  Cases must be decided based on facts and law,
not public appeal. For the legal correctness of their decisions,
courts are accountable neither to the other branches of gov-
ernment nor to the electorate—but to principles of law as
interpreted by higher courts. 
The public does have the right to expect, however, that
courts will be run efficiently and in a professional manner, and
that every person will be treated fairly and equally. The public
also has the right to expect that judges will be competent,
knowledgeable about the law, and willing and able to behave in
accord with the highest ethical standards. 
Many courts have adopted either trial or appellate court
performance standards by which court performance may prop-
erly be measured. The National Center for State Courts has
recently formulated ten basic statistical measures of court per-
formance.11 Formal criteria for evaluation of judges exist in
many states using merit selection or retention processes. The
ultimate standard to which judges and courts should be held
accountable, however—and the real test of judicial perfor-
mance—is whether courts serve to the general satisfaction of
the litigants and public whom they serve. The courts are also
dependent on public trust and confidence to obtain the public
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to a functioning judiciary.
Over the last five years,
the National Center for
State Courts has conducted
a number of state and
national public opinion
surveys to identify the fac-
tors that most dire c t l y
affect public confidence in
the courts.12 Although sur-
prising to many, the survey
findings consistently iden-
tify the direction in which courts must proceed to build greater
public trust. 
First, the extent of public confidence in the court s
depends substantially more on the respondents’ perc e p t i o n s
of the extent of judicial fairness than on any other aspect of
c o u rt perf o rmance or demographic factor. Whereas attor-
neys’ (and judges’) views of court perf o rmance depend more
on their perceptions of the fairness of court outcomes (in
contrast to the fairness of court pro c e d u re), the views of lit-
igants and members of the public are influenced almost
twice as much by their views of the fairness of court pro c e-
d u re than by their views of the fairness of court outcomes.  
What do we mean by the fairness of court procedure? The
most recent survey used four procedural characteristics to
define the concept of procedural fairness: whether the courts
(1) are unbiased; (2) treat people with respect; (3) listen care-
fully to what people have to say; and (4) are trustworthy, i.e.,
care about the people before them and take their individual
needs into account. The single factor that most greatly influ-
ences respondents’ perceptions of the extent of procedural fair-
ness is their perception of whether judges are honest and fair.
Second, although those with prior jury service experience
hold more favorable views than others of the fairness of court
processes, those with direct prior experience as litigants hold
less favorable views of the courts’ procedural fairness. The
types of cases in which respondents are most critical of proce-
dural fairness are the high-volume cases in which ordinary cit-
izens and unrepresented litigants most frequently appear: traf-
fic, family, and small-claims cases.
Third, whereas two-thirds or more of white, Hispanic, and
Asian-Americans believe that the courts are procedurally fair, a
majority of African-Americans do not. Moreover, a majority of
all respondents believe that African-Americans and Hispanic-
Americans usually receive less favorable results in court than
others, and about two-thirds believe that low-income people
and non-English speakers receive less favorable results.
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F o u rth, the single area of court responsibility in which re s p o n-
dents’ expectations of court perf o rmance are most fre q u e n t l y
unmet is the expectation that the court should “re p o rt to the
public on its job perf o rmance,” i . e ., judicial accountability.  
If the courts are to reinforce and improve their standing
with the public, judges need to critically self-examine the fair-
ness of their interactions, as well as the interactions of court
staff, with those who use our courts, including in traffic, fam-
ily, and small-claims cases. They must also redouble their
efforts to address widespread perceptions of unequal treatment
in the justice system—for the poor, non-English speaking, and
minorities. Finally, the courts must more clearly acknowledge
their accountability to the public they serve and find more and
better ways to report on their performance to the public. 
In the long run, legitimate criticism of the judiciary, left
unaddressed, is a far greater threat to the independence of the
judiciary than unfounded attacks. And understandably so.
Democracy is a system of checks and balances. How can the
judiciary expect the public or other branches of government to
defer to the independence of the judiciary if the judiciary can-
not demonstrate its own ability to do a good job—and properly
manage its own affairs?  As one commentator has noted, “Part
of being master of your own home is keeping your house in
order.”13 In effect, our system of checks and balances strikes a
bargain with the judiciary. In consideration for the judiciary’s
relative independence, the public and other branches of gov-
ernment expect that we will do our job well and keep our
house in order. If we cannot, or do not, do that, we are not in
any credible position to complain about the inevitable intru-
sions on our independence that result. 
Among the various sources of legitimate criticism, the great-
est threat to judicial independence is the perception that courts
do not treat people fairly and equally. The surveys show that
these perceptions affect public confidence in the judiciary
more than any other factor. Judicial fairness and equal justice
under law are fundamental expectations of the American jus-
tice system—and of judges in particular. Unfair and unequal
treatment are perceived by litigants and the public not as inci-
dents of technical incompetence but as fundamental defects of
judicial character. Lay members of the public may not believe
that they have sufficient qualifications or experience to evalu-
ate judicial competence—or determine whether judges have
correctly decided the law—but they surely do believe that they
are able to judge our character, our honesty and our fairness,
and decide whether we are worthy of their trust. 
Yes, we in the judiciary must seek to protect American
courts from unfair attacks leveled in the name of judicial
accountability and from other inappropriate external interfer-
In the long run,
legitimate criticism
of the judiciary, left
unaddressed, is a





ence in the independence of courts. For example, we must
continue to implement the recommendations put forth in the
Call to Action issued by participants in the National Summit
on Improving Judicial Selection held December 2000.14 We
must not be distracted, however, from maintaining an even
firmer resolve to address legitimate criticism of our perfor-
mance in administering justice fairly, equally, and effectively. In
the end, the surest path to true independence is the path of
judicial accountability—wherein the courts define and com-
municate the standards to which they may properly be held
accountable—and then continuously demonstrate to the satis-
faction of the public and other branches of government that
their performance meets those standards. Most critically, the
courts must honestly reexamine whether their day-to-day
processes provide fair and equal treatment to all.    
It is we the judges who must lead this charge. If we do,
future external attacks on the judiciary, albeit troubling, will
substantially erode neither public trust in the courts nor the
courts’ continued independence.   
In closing, let us be reminded that judicial independence is
only a concept, an ideal. The United States enjoys the strongest
and most independent judiciary in the world, and our federal
and state constitutions contain provisions intended to promote
the independence of our judiciaries. There is nothing in our
laws, however, that guarantees judicial independence. Judicial
independence has to be continually fought for—and won
anew—each day. It is grounded in public respect for the courts
and for the judicial function.  Like respect, it cannot be
demanded.  It must be earned. 
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